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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Requiring occurrent propositional knowledge as a precondi... — Carmelics
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    Perspectives
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    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Requiring occurrent propositional knowledge as a precondition for epistemic moves leads to an infinite regress.

    Skepticism
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If occurrent knowledge of a proposition P is required before one can make an epistemic move, then one would need occurrent knowledge of a further proposition to license the use of P, and so on without end.
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    • 2.Lewis Carroll's tortoise-and-Achilles argument demonstrates this regress structure.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' argues that some propositions function as hinges: they are not known occurrently but stand fast as the unquestioned framework enabling inquiry.
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    • 2.Hinge propositions are not premises in an inferential chain, so requiring their occurrent recognition as a precondition for every epistemic move misrepresents their logical role.
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    • 3.If the regress argument depends on treating all epistemic warrants as propositional premises subject to further justification, it begs the question against non-propositional foundationalism.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Ryle's distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how shows that many epistemic moves are grounded in dispositions, not occurrent propositional states.
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    • 2.If foundational epistemic moves are exercises of competence rather than applications of propositions, Carroll's regress never gets started.
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    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Key Terms

    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

    Related

    Hinge propositions are not premises in an inferential chain, so requiring their ...If foundational epistemic moves are exercises of competence rather than applicat...If occurrent knowledge of a proposition P is required before one can make an epi...If the regress argument depends on treating all epistemic warrants as propositio...
    +3 moreShow less
    Lewis Carroll's tortoise-and-Achilles argument demonstrates this regress structu...Ryle's distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how shows that many epistemi...Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' argues that some propositions function as hinges: ...

    Similar

    Requiring occurrent propositional knowledge for epistemic moves genera...84%If occurrent knowledge of a proposition P is required before one can m...81%Inferring probabilistic or logical connections from further propositio...78%The resulting regress must either loop back to a prior belief in the c...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: attention
    View source passageHide passage
    In both the a priori case and the perceptual case, the acquisition of knowledge seems to require attention on at least some occasions, and in both of these cases that requirement seems to be a practical one. It may be that knowledge of some propositions is required if one’s experience with a gorilla is to provide one with knowledge of the gorilla’s presence (with the propositions here being of a sort that could serve as a major premise in an inference by which one’s perceptual experience was int
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit