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    Retentionalist accounts do not face the problem of requir... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Retentionalist accounts do not face the problem of requiring impossible static momentary experiences.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.A Retentionalist specious present is a momentary episode of experiencing whose contents are subjectively dynamic.
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    • 2.The impossibility objection targets only momentary experiences whose contents are entirely static.
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    • 3.Because Retentionalist specious presents are by hypothesis subjectively dynamic, they satisfy the requirement that all experiences contain an element of change.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A momentary experience whose content merely represents change (via retention) does not itself undergo change, and thus remains a static vehicle of dynamic content.
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    • 2.The impossibility objection, properly construed by Broad and Husserl's critics, targets the static nature of the experiential vehicle, not merely the represented content.
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    • 3.Retentionalism relocates rather than dissolves the problem: a momentary state encoding temporal flow is still a temporally unextended, static particular.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.If retentional content is itself experienced as past, then the retention must be distinguished from a present-moment impression, requiring a higher-order act to unify them into a single experience.
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    • 2.This regress, identified by Gurwitsch and later Barry Dainton, means that Retentionalism implicitly presupposes the very extended temporal window it claims to derive from momentary states.
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    Topics

    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    A Retentionalist specious present is a momentary episode of experiencing whose c...A momentary experience whose content merely represents change (via retention) do...Because Retentionalist specious presents are by hypothesis subjectively dynamic,...If retentional content is itself experienced as past, then the retention must be...
    +4 moreShow less
    Retentionalism relocates rather than dissolves the problem: a momentary state en...The impossibility objection targets only momentary experiences whose contents ar...The impossibility objection, properly construed by Broad and Husserl's critics, ...This regress, identified by Gurwitsch and later Barry Dainton, means that Retent...

    Similar

    We have good reason to believe that strictly static, momentary experie...85%Entirely static momentary experiences are impossible because the brief...83%The impossibility objection targets only momentary experiences whose c...79%The 'succession of static snapshots' conception of experience, as prop...68%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: consciousness-temporal
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    Still more recently, Pelczar has argued (2010a, 2010b) that the Extensional model rests on an inadequate conception of the temporal microstructure of consciousness. An Extensional specious present is a chunk of experiencing which extends over a second or so of ordinary time, so it will inevitably possesses temporal parts – the still briefer chunks of experiencing of which it is composed – and the briefest of these parts will be strictly momentary episodes of experiencing. Since on the Extensiona
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit