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Inverse View
It is not the case that Reusing a belief-forming mechanism does not constitute simulation of belief unless the outputs are functionally isomorphic to actual beliefs.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Functional isomorphism is too strict; it risks circularity by assuming we already know what 'real belief' functionally requires.
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2.
Whether outputs constitute beliefs depends on broader systems and contexts, not mechanism reuse alone—the claim oversimplifies.
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3.
If a mechanism produces states with identical causal roles despite reuse, denying them belief-status seems merely terminological, not substantive.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Functional isomorphism is necessary for genuine cognitive phenomena; without it, we have mere mechanical similarity lacking intentionality.
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2.
Reused mechanisms without matching functional roles produce outputs that differ in causal-relational properties essential to belief.
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3.
Simulation requires indistinguishability from the real thing; non-isomorphic outputs fail this criterion by definition.
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