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It is not the case that Ronald Dworkin argued that liberal equality has one correct interpretation grounded in equal concern and respect, not a family of reasonable variants.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Equal concern and respect can ground multiple coherent institutional designs (welfare state, market-based, egalitarian), each defensible.
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2.
Dworkin's own work shows evolution and revision, suggesting even his framework allows reasonable interpretive pluralism, not singular truth.
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3.
Empirically, liberal democracies reasonably disagree on equality's meaning while genuinely respecting equal concern—suggesting variants are legitimate.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Equal concern and respect is a foundational principle that logically entails specific institutional requirements, not mere aspirations.
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2.
Treating equality as a family of variants risks collapse into relativism where any distribution can claim equal concern justification.
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3.
Dworkin's approach provides principled grounds to adjudicate between competing interpretations, rather than deferring to political preference.
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