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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Rowe's interpretation of P smuggles in an epistemic limitation by defining P relative to 'known goods', making the entailment trivially true by definitional fiat rather than substantive metaphysical necessity.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Defining concepts relative to accessible knowledge is standard practice; it doesn't automatically render conclusions trivial or question-begging.
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    • 2.Rowe's argument aims to show *if* omniscience involves knowledge of good states, then gratuitous evils become problematic—a conditional necessity.
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    • 3.The charge of 'definitional fiat' requires demonstrating Rowe's definition is arbitrary rather than tracking our actual concept of omniscience.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Defining P via 'known goods' restricts its scope to epistemic access, not metaphysical reality, conflating epistemology with ontology.
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    • 2.If P's truth follows merely from its definition rather than from world-structure, the argument proves nothing about actual divine omniscience.
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    • 3.Substantive theodicy requires showing God could permit evil given reality's constraints, not just what fits a stipulated conceptual framework.
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