Russell and Ramsey's structural realism holds that while we cannot know the intrinsic nature of physical relata, we can have genuine knowledge of the formal relations that constitute reality's structure.
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epistemology(Contrasted with purely descriptive scientific inquiry)
A normative enterprise that tells us how we ought to reason from evidence and how we ought to justify our beliefs, as distinct from merely describing how we do reason or justify beliefs
formal relations(Lowe's pluralist ontology; used to explain why these relations do not generate Bradley's regress)
Relations such as characterization, instantiation, and exemplification that are categorically distinct from garden-variety relations like giving or loving; formal relations are not contingent glue between independently existing constituents
genuine knowledge(The standard other natural philosophers at the end of the seventeenth century continued to uphold, leading them to deny that explanations of natural phenomena qualify as knowledge)
In the Aristotelian model, knowledge that achieves certainty through intuition and demonstration, as opposed to probable or uncertain explanations
knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.
structural realism(Philosophy of science; the position all three critics are attacking)
The view that our best scientific theories give us knowledge of the structure of the world but not of its intrinsic nature or content, typically motivated by the problem of theory change