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It is not the case that Russell's paradox is dissolved by type theory without invoking 'illegitimate totalities'—the restriction is syntactic, not metaphysical.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
Syntactic rules must ultimately reflect something about reality; distinguishing type levels presupposes a metaphysical structure among collections.
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2.
Calling restrictions 'merely syntactic' obscures why those particular rules work—they work because self-membership is genuinely problematic metaphysically.
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3.
Type theory still implicitly rejects certain totalities as illegitimate; relabeling this as 'syntactic' rather than 'metaphysical' is semantic theater.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Type theory's hierarchical syntax prevents self-reference by structural rules alone, avoiding metaphysical assumptions about set existence.
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2.
Syntactic restrictions are more parsimonious: they explain Russell's paradox without positing that some totalities are genuinely illegitimate.
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3.
Type theory successfully formalizes mathematics without metaphysical commitments, proving syntactic solutions suffice for foundational purposes.
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