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    Russellian monism entails that quiddities ground physical... — Carmelics
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    Supports→The relationship between quiddities and dispositions is not metaphysically contingent under Russellian monism

    Russellian monism entails that quiddities ground physical dispositions in a necessary rather than contingent way

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
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    SEP: russellian-monism
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    In response to the first version of that objection, on which quiddities lack physical efficacy, some reject the assumption that any such conclusion follows from the premise that a single type of physical disposition might have been grounded by a distinct quiddity from the quiddity that actually grounds it (Hawthorne 2002, Alter and Coleman forthcoming). Causal relations, it is argued, do not in generally hold with metaphysical necessity. So, why must the relationship between quiddities and dispo

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