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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
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    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Russellian monism thus conflates the epistemic gap between structural descriptions and their categorical basis with a genuine ontological grounding relation that quiddities cannot discharge.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The distinction between 'epistemic gap' and 'ontological gap' may be unfounded—all ontological claims are justified through epistemic access.
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    • 2.Quiddities as primitive properties could discharge grounding by simply being identical to categorical bases, requiring no further explanation.
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    • 3.Russellian monism succeeds precisely by rejecting the premise that quiddities must 'do explanatory work'—they exist, not explain structures.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Structural descriptions only capture relational properties, leaving categorical properties explanatorily inert—a genuine gap requiring grounding.
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    • 2.Quiddities (bare categorical properties) lack intrinsic connections to structural roles, so cannot explain why structures instantiate in physical reality.
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    • 3.Conflating epistemic limitations with ontological gaps obscures why physics describes only structures yet needs something to ground them.
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