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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Scotus's formal distinction allows real entities to be really identical yet formally distinct, meaning formal non-identity is compatible with real identity.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If two things are really identical, any intelligible difference between them must reduce to subjective conceptualization, making 'formal distinction' explanatorily empty.
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    • 2.Formal distinction threatens the logical principle that if A is identical to B and B is identical to C, then A is identical to C without residual non-identity.
      ?

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    • 3.The distinction collapses into either real difference (violating real identity) or mere mental distinction (offering no metaphysical insight beyond nominalism).
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Divine attributes (justice, mercy) are really identical in God yet conceptually distinct to finite minds, requiring a distinction beyond real identity.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Essence and existence in creatures differ in how we apprehend them despite being one thing, suggesting formal distinction captures this epistemic gap.
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      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Some properties of objects (shape, color) seem genuinely unified yet our concepts treat them separately, vindicating formal non-identity without real separation.
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