Scotus's formal distinction demonstrates that even in a single simple being, rationes can differ formaliter without numerical multiplicity, undermining the inference from immateriality to nature-identity.

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Formaliter(How the rationes differ from each other): A Latin adverb meaning 'in terms of their formal nature or essence'—it describes differences that are real in the thing itself, not just in how we think about it.
Immateriality(as a property attributed to the intellect): The quality of not being made of physical matter or material substance; existing as non-physical.
Nature-identity(The conclusion that Scotus undermines): The idea that something's essential nature or defining characteristic is identical to (completely the same as) something else—or that one simple being has only one fundamental nature.
Numerical multiplicity(What does NOT happen even when things differ formally): The condition of being more than one distinct object or thing; having actual multiple parts or separate items.

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