Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Selling the land to the threatening party is the landowne... — Carmelics
    Home/Consequentialism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→Precommitment strategies can compel an otherwise unwilling counterparty to transact

    Selling the land to the threatening party is the landowner's available means of avoiding that ruin

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract

    Connections

    2 topics

    Rights & Liberty1 linked

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Consequentialism
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Justice & Punishment
    1 linked

    Related

    If a landowner refuses to sell, the threatening party is contractually obligated...Precommitment strategies can compel an otherwise unwilling counterparty to trans...The landowner has a strong incentive to avoid the ruination of their property

    Similar

    The landowner has a strong incentive to avoid the ruination of their p...83%If the landowner refuses to sell, carrying out the threat would damage...83%If a landowner refuses to sell, the threatening party is contractually...78%If the threatening party has no choice but to follow through, the othe...74%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    However, I could make my threat credible by committing myself. For example, I could sign a contract with some farmers promising to supply them with treated sewage (fertilizer) from my plant, but including an escape clause in the contract releasing me from my obligation only if I can double my lot size and so put it to some other use. Now my threat is credible: if you don’t sell, I’m committed to building the sewage plant. Since you know this, you now have an incentive to sell me your land in ord

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective