Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Sentences cannot be about understandings alone — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Sentences cannot be about understandings alone

    Philosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The sentence 'If something is human, it is an animal' would be false if taken to be about understandings
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Someone could entertain the concept human without entertaining the concept animal
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If sentences were about understandings, the antecedent of that conditional could obtain without the consequent, making the conditional false
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A sentence about understandings can be necessarily true if the understandings themselves stand in necessary conceptual relations.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The concept 'human' analytically contains 'animal' such that entertaining 'human' necessarily co-involves 'animal' as a constituent.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If conceptual containment is a real structural feature of mental content, then the conditional holds at the level of understandings without requiring extra-mental referents.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows that sentences can be about senses (modes of presentation) rather than objects while still having determinate truth conditions.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If intensional entities like senses or understandings are themselves structured and law-governed, Abelard's counterexample fails to establish that truth requires mind-independent referents.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of Language

    Connections

    3 topics

    Truth & Knowledge2 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A sentence about understandings can be necessarily true if the understandings th...But that conditional is not falseFrege's distinction between sense and reference shows that sentences can be abou...If conceptual containment is a real structural feature of mental content, then t...
    +5 moreShow less
    If intensional entities like senses or understandings are themselves structured ...If sentences were about understandings, the antecedent of that conditional could...

    Similar

    Human thought essentially involves understanding.83%The argument from understanding cannot be straightforwardly applied to...80%Empathy-based understanding appears to conceive of understanding as a ...80%Empathy alone is insufficient to account for all forms of understandin...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: abelard
    View source passageHide passage
    Abelard argues that sentences (propositiones) must signify more than just the understandings of the constituent name and verb. First, a sentence such as ‘Socrates runs’ deals with Socrates and with running, not with anyone’s understandings. We talk about the world, not merely someone’s understanding of the world. Second, sentences like ‘If something is human, it is an animal’ are false if taken to be about understandings, for someone could entertain the concept human without entertaining the con
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Someone could entertain the concept human without entertaining the concept anima...
    The concept 'human' analytically contains 'animal' such that entertaining 'human...
    The sentence 'If something is human, it is an animal' would be false if taken to...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit