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    Sentences do not have truth conditions — Carmelics
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    Supports→Expressions as such do not bear semantically interesting relations to things in the world

    Sentences do not have truth conditions

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    Expressions as such do not bear semantically interesting relations to things in ...Names do not refer to the objects with which they might be associatedPredicates do not have extensionsThe internalist denies that giving the content of an expression primarily specif...

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    Sentence meanings do not determine truth-conditions.87%The truth conditions of 'not-not-A' just are the truth conditions of A...87%The truth conditions of 'not-A' are exhausted by: 'not-A' is true when...83%Knowledge requires truth.82%

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    It is easy to say what this approach to semantics denies. The internalist denies an assumption common to all of the approaches discussed so far: the assumption that in giving the content of an expression, we are primarily specifying something about that expression’s relation to things in the world which that expression might be used to say things about. According to the internalist, expressions as such don’t bear any semantically interesting relations to things in the world; names don’t, for exa

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