Set-talk can be systematically paraphrased as talk about concrete pluralities or mereological fusions, as Goodman and Quine demonstrated in 'Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism'.

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Concrete pluralities(as an alternative way to describe what sets are): Multiple actual, physical things you can point to, rather than abstract ideas; like saying 'these five books' instead of 'the set of five books.'
Constructive Nominalism(as the philosophical approach mentioned in the paper title): A philosophical view that argues we should only use concrete, real objects in our descriptions of the world, not abstract ideas like 'sets' that don't physically exist.
Goodman and Quine(as the philosophers being credited with this idea): Two important 20th-century philosophers (Nelson Goodman and Willard Van Orman Quine) who studied logic, language, and how we describe reality.
Mereological fusions(as used in metaphysics/philosophy of mind): Collections of smaller things combined together as a single whole; in this case, combining multiple mental states into one object.
Paraphrased(describing how mathematical truths are reexpressed): Restated or rewrote in a different way while keeping the same meaning.
Set-talk(as used in philosophy of mathematics): Statements and discussions about sets—collections of objects treated as single units in mathematics (like 'the set of all even numbers').

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