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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Set theory cannot be about bunches of ordinary objects or piles of physical stuff

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Corresponding to every physical object, there are infinitely many distinct sets (e.g., the set containing the ball, the set containing that set, and so on)
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.All of these infinitely many sets share the same physical base
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A pile of physical stuff cannot be simultaneously identical to infinitely many distinct objects sharing the same physical base
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Sets are individuated by their membership conditions, not spatiotemporal location, making physical coincidence metaphysically impossible for distinct sets.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Extensionality axioms entail that set identity is fully determined by members, yet physical stuff has no determinate membership facts without abstract structure.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Paul Benacerraf's multiple-reductions argument shows physical bases underdetermine set-theoretic identity, severing any coherent reduction to physical objects.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The empty set exists as a genuine mathematical object, yet no physical stuff or ordinary object corresponds to it, falsifying any purely nominalist reduction.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.George Boolos's plural quantification cannot rescue physicalism because iterative hierarchy requires sets of sets, which no finite physical base can ground.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.