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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Some degree of motivation is a minimally necessary condit... — Carmelics
    Statements
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Some degree of motivation is a minimally necessary condition for a genuine moral judgment.

    Consequentialism
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If one claims that something is morally wrong but feels no disinclination to do it or to persuade others not to do it, then one is either being insincere or not making a genuine moral claim.
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    • 2.A moral judgment that is sincere must therefore be accompanied by at least some motivation to act.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Moral judgments can be genuine cognitive beliefs about objective moral facts that are entirely motivationally inert without ceasing to be moral judgments.
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    • 2.On Humean motivational psychology, beliefs alone never motivate; only desires do, so a moral belief need not carry motivational force to be genuine.
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    • 3.Amoralists, as described by Shafer-Landau and Railton, can sincerely assent to moral propositions while lacking corresponding motivation, demonstrating that judgment and motivation are conceptually separable.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The supporting argument conflates sincerity of assertion with motivational engagement, but one can sincerely report a moral fact the way one sincerely reports a mathematical fact, without being moved by it.
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    • 2.Depression and akrasia produce well-documented cases where agents make genuine moral judgments yet experience no corresponding motivational pull, suggesting motivation is contingent rather than constitutive of moral judgment.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsequentialism

    Connections

    1 topic

    Virtue Ethics2 linked

    Related

    A moral judgment that is sincere must therefore be accompanied by at least some ...Amoralists, as described by Shafer-Landau and Railton, can sincerely assent to m...Depression and akrasia produce well-documented cases where agents make genuine m...If one claims that something is morally wrong but feels no disinclination to do ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Moral judgments can be genuine cognitive beliefs about objective moral facts tha...On Humean motivational psychology, beliefs alone never motivate; only desires do...The supporting argument conflates sincerity of assertion with motivational engag...

    Similar

    A moral judgment that is sincere must therefore be accompanied by at l...88%If moral judgments entail motivation, then moral judgments must be at ...85%If moral judgments entail motivation and no ordinary belief entails mo...84%For moral considerations to be motivating, they must produce some felt...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-epistemology
    View source passageHide passage
    Premise (1) appears to follow directly from the nature of knowledge. If one knows that something is the case, then one must have some belief or judgment about it and what one believes must truly be the case. If one doesn’t have any opinion about it or if one’s opinion about it is not true, then one doesn’t know it. To say this much, of course, is not to say that true opinion is sufficient for knowledge, but that one’s judgment is true has seemed to many philosophers to be a minimally necessary c
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit