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    Some kind of integrity is necessary to be an agent. — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Supports→Integrity necessary for agency cannot be achieved without a commitment to morality founded on reason.

    Some kind of integrity is necessary to be an agent.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
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    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

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    Integrity necessary for agency cannot be achieved without a commitment to morali...Integrity requires coherent reflective self-government guided by universal princ...Universal principles of self-government are grounded in morality, which is found...

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    Korsgaard (1996a) offers a transcendental argument for the conclusion that what we ought to do is justified by the norms that govern and constitute our rational agency. She argues that valuing humanity, where humanity is understood as the capacity for rationality, is the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all (Korsgaard 1996a: 121–123; Korsgaard 1998: 60–62). In deliberating, we attribute to ourselves the power to confer value on our ends by rationally choosing them. According t

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