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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Some thought experiments, like Kripke's Gödel case, generate modal intuitions about necessity that outrun any empirical observation or inductive generalization.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.What feels like modal necessity may reflect deeply internalized linguistic conventions and conceptual frameworks acquired through ordinary experience.
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    • 2.The universality of intuitions about Gödel's identity could derive from shared cognitive architecture for tracking individuals, not a priori modal knowledge.
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    • 3.Thought experiments succeed rhetorically by leveraging familiar patterns; their persuasiveness doesn't establish that conclusions transcend empirical grounds.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's case elicits robust cross-cultural intuitions about rigid designation that can't be explained by prior experience or learned patterns.
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    • 2.Modal knowledge about necessary identity (Gödel is necessarily Gödel) seems knowable a priori through conceptual analysis, not induction.
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    • 3.If all modal intuitions required empirical grounding, we couldn't explain our ability to recognize modal falsehoods in hypotheticals we've never encountered.
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