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    Specifying that basic beliefs lack inferential justificat... — Carmelics
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    Supports→DB's negative specification—that basic beliefs are not inferentially justified—is itself a substantive positive constraint that delimits the justificatory structure.

    Specifying that basic beliefs lack inferential justification substantively commits one to foundationalism, which is a positive epistemological thesis about justification's architecture.

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    Key Terms

    Positive epistemological thesis(in epistemology)
    A claim that confidently asserts something is true about how knowledge and belief work, rather than just saying what it's not.
    architecture(Hegel's aesthetics; architecture as indirect or preparatory expression (PKÄ, 155, 166))
    The art that gives matter an abstract, inorganic form created by human understanding, investing matter with strict regularity, symmetry, and harmony, thereby creating an artfully shaped surrounding for the direct expression of spiritual freedom in sculpture
    basic beliefs(Foundationalist epistemology)
    Beliefs that are justified by seemings or experiences rather than by other beliefs; they would not be basic if their justifying states were themselves beliefs
    epistemology(Contrasted with purely descriptive scientific inquiry)
    A normative enterprise that tells us how we ought to reason from evidence and how we ought to justify our beliefs, as distinct from merely describing how we do reason or justify beliefs

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    foundationalism(Presented as the conclusion of the epistemic regress argument)
    The epistemological view that some beliefs have justification without depending on other beliefs, serving as the non-inferential base for all other justified beliefs
    inferential justification(Contrasted with non-inferential (foundational) justification)
    Justification for a belief that is derived by inference from one or more other believed propositions
    justification(Third condition of the tripartite account of knowledge)
    The condition on a knower's belief that excludes mere luck — the belief must be held in a way that is appropriate or warranted, not merely accidentally correct.

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    DB's negative specification—that basic beliefs are not inferentially justified—i...

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    DB's negative specification—that basic beliefs are not inferentially justified—i...

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