Stich's 'subdoxastic states' and Dennett's intentional stance both demonstrate that attributing belief-like states to animals yields predictively successful explanatory frameworks.
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Mental states that are similar to beliefs but exist below the level of conscious awareness—think of them as beliefs that an animal might have without being able to express or fully 'think' them.
intentional stance(Dennett's terminology; used to explain how talk of 'persons' functions in folk psychology without committing to persons as metaphysically real entities)
A cognitive stance one adopts toward a system by treating it as if it has beliefs, desires, and intentions, without this stance corresponding to the system's intrinsic metaphysical properties