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Inverse View
It is not the case that Strong Evidentialism can be reformulated probabilistically: one may believe p when pragmatic stakes raise the epistemic threshold, not bypass it.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
If stakes can raise thresholds, they can lower them too—nothing stops this framework from justifying wishful thinking.
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2.
Probability of truth is independent of pragmatic stakes; raising thresholds conflates epistemic and practical rationality.
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3.
This reformulation is merely terminological: calling threshold-raising 'not bypassing' evidence obscures that stakes drive belief.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Epistemic thresholds are not fixed points but contextual: higher stakes rationally warrant stricter evidence standards.
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2.
This view preserves evidentialism's core (belief requires adequate evidence) while accommodating pragmatic rationality.
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3.
Medical and legal practice show we rationally adjust confidence requirements by consequences, not abandon evidence demands.
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