Strong supervenience requires counterfactual dependence in the same world. Relational and world-indexed properties are world-relative, making them unsuitable for grounding strong supervenience across modal space.
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grounding(Drawn from contemporary metaphysics; proposed as potentially applicable to understanding the foundations of legality.)
A metaphysical relation in which some entities or facts are more foundational than others, providing a hierarchical structure of the world.
relational properties(Contrasted with intrinsic properties in the property-dualist two-aspects theory)
Properties of objects that appear to us and are spatial and temporal
strong supervenience(Conceded by Kim to not be entailed by global supervenience)
A supervenience relation where, across all possible worlds, any individual that shares B-properties with another individual also shares A-properties with that individual
supervenience(Philosophy of mind and reduction; contrasted with full reduction)
A relation in which mental (or higher-level) states are dependent on physiological (or lower-level) states such that any two cases with identical lower-level bases are identical in their higher-level states; a necessary but not sufficient condition for reduction.