Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Stuart Rachels and Temkin acknowledge that abandoning tra... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→We cannot exorcise the paradoxes of population ethics by giving up the transitivity of 'better than'

    Stuart Rachels and Temkin acknowledge that abandoning transitivity generates what they call 'essentially comparative' value, yet this move simply relocates rather than resolves the underlying tension between quantity and quality of welfare.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Transitivity assumes value comparisons follow mathematical logic, but welfare involves incommensurable dimensions that resist linear ordering.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Abandoning transitivity reveals rather than creates the problem: quality-quantity tensions exist independently of which formal framework we adopt.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Essentially comparative value honestly reflects that some welfare trade-offs lack principled resolution, which relocating the tension actually acknowledges.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If essentially comparative value merely relocates tensions, it provides no practical guidance for actual welfare decisions—it just accepts incoherence.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Rejecting transitivity to preserve quality-quantity distinctions abandons logical consistency without gaining explanatory power about welfare itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Key Terms

    Essentially comparative value(what results from abandoning transitivity)
    The idea that something's worth or goodness can only be measured by directly comparing it to something else, rather than having a fixed, independent value.
    Quantity and quality of welfare(the core tension being discussed)
    Quantity refers to how much well-being someone has (more happiness is better), while quality refers to what *kind* of well-being it is (some say deep satisfaction matters more than simple pleasure).
    Stuart Rachels(mentioned as someone studying welfare and value)
    A contemporary philosopher who writes about ethics and how we should think about what makes life good or bad.
    Temkin(mentioned as a collaborator with Rachels on this problem)
    Larry Temkin, a philosopher who specializes in ethics and has written extensively about fairness, equality, and how to compare different outcomes.
    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.
    transitivity(Applied to the temporal relation 'earlier than' on a set of worlds W)
    A property of a relation R such that if wRv and vRu, then wRu
    welfare(Critique of Stein's strict health-welfare correlation)
    A subjective notion of well-being that is affected by multiple domains, not health alone.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consequentialism1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Abandoning transitivity reveals rather than creates the problem: quality-quantit...Essentially comparative value honestly reflects that some welfare trade-offs lac...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    If essentially comparative value merely relocates tensions, it provides no pract...
    Rejecting transitivity to preserve quality-quantity distinctions abandons logica...
    +2 moreShow less
    Transitivity assumes value comparisons follow mathematical logic, but welfare in...We cannot exorcise the paradoxes of population ethics by giving up the transitiv...