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    Substantive moral realism simply assumes the existence of... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Challenges→Substantive moral realism fails to respond to the skeptical challenge that there are no reasons to be moral.

    Substantive moral realism simply assumes the existence of objective standards for morality without offering a rational basis for them.

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    An account that merely assumes what the skeptic denies cannot count as a respons...Substantive moral realism fails to respond to the skeptical challenge that there...The skeptic denies that such objective moral standards exist.

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    Modal realism entails that there are no moral requirements.90%Substantive moral realism fails as an account of the authority of mora...88%Substantive moral realism fails to respond to the skeptical challenge ...88%The need for objective moral standards is practical rather than purely...88%

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    Korsgaard’s case for constructivism parallels Kant’s argument for the autonomy of practical reason, as Rawls reconstructs it. It starts by objecting that substantive realism fails to respond to the skeptical challenge that there really are no reasons to be moral. This is because realism simply assumes the existence of objective standards for morality without offering a rational basis for them; hence the realist affirms what the skeptic denies. As a consequence, the realist also fails to show why

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