Such sentences can still be used to say something essentially accurate about a person's belief state, because there are facts about that person that make it true that if propositions existed, the belief attribution would be true
How an agent believes something, as distinguished from what she believes; in Perry's later work, individuated in terms of narrow functional role.
essentially accurate(describing how well a sentence captures the truth)
True in the way that matters most, even if not perfectly precise in every detail.
proposition(Used in the context of a semantic theory sensitive to differences in subject matter.)
The content expressed by a sentence, individuated at least in part by the subject matter of the sentence and the contents of its subsentential expressions.
However, while paraphrase nominalism seems hopeless in the case of propositions, Balaguer (1998b) has argued that fictionalistic nominalism carries over very well to the case of propositions. More specifically, fictionalists can say that ‘Clinton believes that snow is white’ is strictly speaking not true (because its ‘that’-clause is supposed to refer to a proposition, and there are no such things as propositions) but that we can still use it to say something essentially accurate about Clinton's