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    Supervenience of the moral on the descriptive means there... — Carmelics
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    Supports→There cannot be two worlds exactly alike in all descriptive respects where a moral statement is true in one and false in the other

    Supervenience of the moral on the descriptive means there can be no moral difference unless there is some descriptive difference

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    The moral supervenes on the descriptiveThere cannot be two worlds exactly alike in all descriptive respects where a mor...

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    The supervenience of the moral on the descriptive entails that there c...94%The moral supervenes on the descriptive88%Modern moral theory holds that there is a fact-value distinction that ...78%Non-moral descriptions can always replace moral explanations of phenom...77%

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    SEP: moral-epistemology-a-priori
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    Now, although it is an odd sentence—a very long disjunction—there is an important fact about D: it entails E and it is entailed by E. If E is true, then one of the disjuncts of D must be true, because D contains a disjunct describing every world where E is true; hence, D will be true as well. On the other hand, if D is true, then one of its disjuncts must be true, say it is Dn. E could not be false in a world described by Dn because Dn is included as a disjunct of D. Hence, if E were false in a

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