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    Synthetic a priori propositions can be objects of a prior... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Synthetic a priori propositions can be objects of a priori intuitions.

    Modality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.A priori intuitions are states where a proposition seems true solely on the basis of understanding it.
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    • 2.Synthetic a priori propositions can seem true to a person solely on the basis of understanding them.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kant's synthetic a priori propositions (e.g., '7+5=12') derive their necessity from the forms of intuition (space/time), not from conceptual understanding alone.
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    • 2.If synthetic a priori truth requires Kantian spatiotemporal intuition as its ground, then 'seeming true upon understanding' is not the operative epistemic mechanism.
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    • 3.The supporting argument conflates propositional understanding with the transcendental conditions Kant held necessary for synthetic a priori cognition.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.A priori intuitions, as Quine argues in 'Two Dogmas,' cannot be reliably distinguished from deeply entrenched empirical beliefs resistant to revision.
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    • 2.If the feeling of necessity in synthetic a priori propositions is indistinguishable from strong empirical habituation, 'intuition' fails as an epistemic category.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Skepticism1 linked

    Related

    A priori intuitions are states where a proposition seems true solely on the basi...A priori intuitions, as Quine argues in 'Two Dogmas,' cannot be reliably disting...If synthetic a priori truth requires Kantian spatiotemporal intuition as its gro...If the feeling of necessity in synthetic a priori propositions is indistinguisha...
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    Kant's synthetic a priori propositions (e.g., '7+5=12') derive their necessity f...Synthetic a priori propositions can seem true to a person solely on the basis of...The supporting argument conflates propositional understanding with the transcend...

    Similar

    Russell's account of a priori intuition can distinguish between a prio...88%A priori intuitions can be distinguished from physical intuitions by w...87%A priori intuitions are states where a proposition seems true solely o...87%Synthetic a priori propositions can seem true to a person solely on th...86%

    Source

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    SEP: apriori
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    We have seen that Bealer thinks that a rational intuition is a modal seeming: either a seeming to be true and necessarily true, or a seeming to be possible. In other places Russell (2017: 232) defines an a priori intuition as the psychological state people are in when some proposition seems true to them solely on the basis of their understanding that proposition. This definition of an a priori intuition allows us to distinguish between what Bealer called a physical intuition that a house undermi
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit