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    That would place the First Being in potentiality to some ... — Carmelics
    Home/Divine Attributes
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    Supports→The First Being has no final cause for its existence.

    That would place the First Being in potentiality to some perfection not had by its essence.

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    A final cause would represent a perfection the First Being aims toward but does ...The First Being has no final cause for its existence.The First Being has no such potentiality.

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    If the First Being aimed at a final cause through its activities, it w...85%The First Being has no potentiality for any perfection not had by its ...84%All potentiality must be grounded in some actuality.82%If the First Being were potentially F, it would depend on something el...80%

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    AI-extracted
    SEP: al-farabi-metaphysics
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    At a first stab: Fârâbî argues that, if something is “first” in the sense that nothing is prior to it, it cannot be dependent on anything for its existence or for its continuation in existence. Therefore it has existed without beginning and will exist without end, and has no potentiality for not existing. It has no efficient cause, but also no material cause: if it had a material cause, its matter would be prior to it, and presumably it would also depend on an efficient cause to turn its matter

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