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    The ability of individuals to control actions or harms is... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The ability of individuals to control actions or harms is not a necessary criterion for collective moral responsibility.

    Moral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Raikka subtracts the control criterion from the conventionally invoked criteria of collective responsibility.
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    • 2.Collective responsibility can attach to individuals who lack control over the system implicating them in evil.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Moral responsibility requires the 'could have done otherwise' condition, as Fischer and Ravizza's reasons-responsiveness account demands agent-level control.
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    • 2.When individuals lack control over a collective system, attributing moral responsibility to them violates the fundamental Kantian principle that 'ought implies can'.
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    • 3.Raikka's subtraction of the control criterion severs moral responsibility from its action-theoretic foundations, collapsing the distinction between responsibility and mere causal implication.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.H.D. Lewis's methodological individualism holds that only individual persons are genuine moral agents, making group-level responsibility a category error unless reducible to individual agency.
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    • 2.Without control as a criterion, collective responsibility becomes indistinguishable from strict liability, which most moral theorists reject as a basis for genuine blameworthiness rather than mere compensatory obligation.
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    Topics

    Moral Responsibility

    Related

    Collective responsibility can attach to individuals who lack control over the sy...H.D. Lewis's methodological individualism holds that only individual persons are...Moral responsibility requires the 'could have done otherwise' condition, as Fisc...Raikka subtracts the control criterion from the conventionally invoked criteria ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Raikka's subtraction of the control criterion severs moral responsibility from i...When individuals lack control over a collective system, attributing moral respon...Without control as a criterion, collective responsibility becomes indistinguisha...

    Similar

    Collective moral responsibility requires that individuals be implicate...86%Forward-looking collective responsibility is not morally salient prima...86%Despite the non-distributional character of collective responsibility,...85%The modern notion of moral responsibility is associated with a unified...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: collective-responsibility
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    Raikka claims in this context that dissenters can be morally blameworthy even if they cannot control the system that implicates them in evil. Hence, he finds it necessary to do two things that not only place him squarely in the camp of Karl Jaspers and other advocates of metaphysical guilt but that are very telling with respect to contemporary philosophical debates about collective responsibility in general. The first is to subtract from the set of conventionally invoked criteria of collective r
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit