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    The akrasia argument (no one errs willingly) logically en... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Premise P3's claim that virtuous character differs from knowledge of forms relies on a post-Aristotelian distinction between intellectual and character virtues that Plato explicitly rejects through his intellectualist account of akrasia in Book IV.

    The akrasia argument (no one errs willingly) logically entails that moral failure stems from cognitive error, not deficient character traits.

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