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Inverse View
It is not the case that The alleged privacy of experience and the intersubjective accessibility of objects cannot be cleanly separated at the level of intentional constitution.
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Reasons For
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Reason for
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1.
The subjective qualitative character (qualia) of experience is irreducibly private and logically separable from any public object constitution.
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2.
Intentional content can be precisely individuated at the level of objective reference independent of any subject's experiential access to it.
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3.
The claim conflates epistemic issues (how we know about experiences) with metaphysical issues (what actually constitutes private vs. public reality).
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Reasons Against
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Reason against
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1.
Intentional objects are always constituted through subjective experience, yet they possess a shared structural form accessible to multiple subjects.
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2.
Privacy of experience and intersubjective accessibility are not metaphysical properties but rather different aspects of a single intentional act.
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3.
Language and conceptual frameworks reveal how private experiential content necessarily embeds public, shareable intentional structures.
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