Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The appearance of an explanatory gap between Mary's old and new knowledge is a cognitive illusion produced by the special first-person character of phenomenal concepts, not evidence of qualia as non-physical entities.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If Mary learns only *new concepts* of old physical facts, not new facts, the knowledge gain seems trivial—yet it intuitively feels substantial.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Merely having different conceptual routes to identical physical properties cannot fully explain why color experience seems qualitatively novel to Mary.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The illusion explanation must specify what mechanism makes us mistake conceptual differences for metaphysical gaps—this burden remains unmet.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Phenomenal concepts access physical properties via introspective/recognitional routes while scientific concepts access them via causal-structural routes.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Two conceptual routes to the same physical property can create an illusion of explanatory gap without revealing non-physical facts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Cognitive illusions about concept-relatedness are common; the gap may reflect our conceptual architecture, not metaphysical reality.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.