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    The argument from possibility may be a specific version o... — Carmelics
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    The argument from possibility may be a specific version of the argument from necessary truths

    Modality & Possibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Truths about what is possible are necessary truths
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    • 2.The argument from possibility derives conclusions from facts about what is possible
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Modal facts about possibility are ontological, concerning how things could be, not merely logical or semantic necessary truths.
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    • 2.Kripke's a posteriori necessary truths demonstrate that necessity and logical/conceptual truth are distinct categories.
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    • 3.The argument from possibility draws on metaphysical modality, which requires a separate grounding story from abstract necessary truths.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Leibniz's argument from possibility grounds possible essences in the divine intellect, making God prior to necessary truths, not their co-explanandum.
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    • 2.If God is the ontological ground of necessary truths, collapsing the two arguments conflates the explanandum with its explanation.
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    Topics

    Natural TheologyModality & Possibility

    Related

    If God is the ontological ground of necessary truths, collapsing the two argumen...Kripke's a posteriori necessary truths demonstrate that necessity and logical/co...Leibniz's argument from possibility grounds possible essences in the divine inte...Modal facts about possibility are ontological, concerning how things could be, n...
    +3 moreShow less
    The argument from possibility derives conclusions from facts about what is possi...The argument from possibility draws on metaphysical modality, which requires a s...Truths about what is possible are necessary truths

    Similar

    The argument from possibility derives conclusions from facts about wha...88%Truths about what is possible are necessary truths83%Some necessary truths can be explained by other necessary truths.81%Empirical Strong AI makes a weaker, possibility claim rather than a ne...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: natural-theology
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    A third sort of a priori proof argues from facts about the mere possibility of something (or of some collection of things) to the existence of a “ground of possibility” that somehow explains them. An early version of such an argument can be found in Augustine and the Neo-Platonic tradition, but the canonical presentations of this sort of “possibility proof” are in Leibniz’s Monadology (1714) and, much more elaborately, in Kant’s book-length treatise called The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstra
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit