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    The argument from reason-possession does not establish ps... — Carmelics
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    The argument from reason-possession does not establish psychologism about motivating reasons.

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    • 1.While an agent must know or believe the thing that constitutes a reason in order to be motivated, it does not follow that the reason motivating the agent is the agent's knowing or believing what they do.
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    • 2.The agent's reason is what is known or believed, namely a putative fact, rather than the knowing or believing itself.
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    • 3.Motivating reasons are the contents of mental states, not mental states themselves.
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    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language

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    Motivating reasons are the contents of mental states, not mental states themselv...The agent's reason is what is known or believed, namely a putative fact, rather ...While an agent must know or believe the thing that constitutes a reason in order...

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    Williams' argument grounds reasons in dispositions to be motivated, no...83%Interpreting motivating reasons as the contents of mental states of be...82%An explanation of why some desires fail to generate reasons may reveal...80%According to psychologism, motivating reasons are mental states.80%

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    Since motivating reasons are considerations that an agent takes to favour acting, and since the reasons that favour acting are facts, it might seem that motivating reasons are also facts or at least putative facts, rather than mental states. However, the view that they are mental states was, as noted earlier, the dominant view till the turn of the 20th century, and it is still very popular today. A seemingly compelling argument for adopting psychologism for motivating reasons is the following. F
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