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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    The assumption that distinct and incommunicable intellect... — Carmelics
    Home/Trinity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The assumption that distinct and incommunicable intellectual acts and volitional acts are necessary conditions for being a person should be rejected.

    Trinity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Boethius defined person as 'an individual substance of a rational nature,' grounding personhood in substance rather than discrete acts.
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    • 2.Aquinas, following Boethius, located personal identity in subsistent relations, not in numerically distinct cognitive or volitional episodes.
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    • 3.If the Boethian-Thomistic tradition grounds personhood without requiring incommunicable acts, the assumption in question lacks historical necessity.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Contemporary analytic philosophers like Brian Leftow argue that a single locus of consciousness can ground multiple personal distinctions via functional roles.
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    • 2.If functional-role differentiation suffices for personal distinction, numerically distinct intellectual and volitional acts are not necessary conditions for personhood.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • This assumption is an ungrounded modern assumption.
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    Topics

    Trinity

    Related

    Aquinas, following Boethius, located personal identity in subsistent relations, ...Boethius defined person as 'an individual substance of a rational nature,' groun...Contemporary analytic philosophers like Brian Leftow argue that a single locus o...If functional-role differentiation suffices for personal distinction, numericall...
    +2 moreShow less
    If the Boethian-Thomistic tradition grounds personhood without requiring incommu...This assumption is an ungrounded modern assumption.

    Similar

    Therefore premises 1 and 2, which apparently treat Father and Son as s...72%Morris's objection that unconditional commitment to two distinct being...69%The argument from premises 1 and 2 to conclusion 3 cannot be rejected ...68%Swinburne's theory of the Trinity should be rejected or is seriously p...67%

    Source

    AI-extracted2/3 agreementValid
    SEP: trinity
    Williams
    View source passageHide passage
    This account denies what some philosophers assume to be obvious, that “distinct and incommunicable intellectual acts and volitional acts are necessary conditions for being a person” (339). Williams rejects this as an ungrounded modern assumption. While it employs recent thinking about indexical terms and other matters, Williams considers this account to fit well with historical theologians such as Gregory of Nyssa, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus (345). That the persons share all mental acts does not imply that they share one mind or that there is one consciousness in the Trinity. Rather,...
    Extraction notes

    Validity: The passage states that Williams rejects the assumption that distinct intellectual and volitional acts are necessary for personhood, characterizing it as "an ungrounded modern assumption," which directly supports the extracted argument's structure of attacking that assumption on the ground that it is ungrounded.

    Confidence: The attack on the claim is explicitly stated in the text.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit