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    The barebones theory of rationality (requiring complete p... — Carmelics
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    The barebones theory of rationality (requiring complete preferences) may be too strong.

    Skepticism
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, foundational to expected utility theory, entails complete preferences as a rational requirement across all decision contexts.
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    • 2.Ellsberg's paradox shows agents systematically violate completeness under ambiguity, yet these violations track coherent epistemic distinctions, not mere confusion.
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    • 3.If coherent epistemic distinctions ground preference gaps, then completeness requirements pathologize rational sensitivity to ambiguity, making the axiom too strong.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Sen's capability approach demonstrates that incommensurable values—health vs. liberty—resist cardinal ranking without imposing arbitrary metric choices.
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    • 2.Requiring complete preferences over incommensurable values forces agents to adopt rankings that misrepresent their actual evaluative commitments.
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    • 3.A rationality standard that systematically distorts genuine evaluative structure is itself irrational by the norms of reflective coherence it purports to enforce.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Having incomplete preferences is not irrational in situations involving uncertainty.
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    • 2.It is sometimes rational to suspend judgment and refuse to rank alternatives that are not well understood.
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    Related

    A rationality standard that systematically distorts genuine evaluative structure...Ellsberg's paradox shows agents systematically violate completeness under ambigu...Having incomplete preferences is not irrational in situations involving uncertai...If coherent epistemic distinctions ground preference gaps, then completeness req...
    +4 moreShow less
    It is sometimes rational to suspend judgment and refuse to rank alternatives tha...Requiring complete preferences over incommensurable values forces agents to adop...Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, foundational to expected utility theory, entails ...Sen's capability approach demonstrates that incommensurable values—health vs. li...

    Similar

    The barebones theory of rationality (completeness + transitivity + bes...90%Transitivity of preferences is a plausible rationality condition.87%Strong rationality is a more demanding condition than weak rationality...82%Global rationality is a reasonable normative standard but problematic ...82%

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    The barebones theory of rationality discussed above in Section 1.1 takes an agent’s preferences (rankings of states of affairs) to be rational if they are complete and transitive, and it takes the agent’s choice to be rational if the agent does not prefer any feasible alternative to the one he or she chooses. Such a theory of rationality is clearly too weak, because it says nothing about belief or what rationality implies when agents do not know (with certainty) everything relevant to their
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit