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    The briefest experiences we can conceive or imagine alway... — Carmelics
    Home/Perception
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    Supports→Experience is essentially subjectively dynamic.

    The briefest experiences we can conceive or imagine always contain some element of change or passage.

    Consciousness & MindPerception
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    PerceptionConsciousness & Mind

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Experience is essentially subjectively dynamic.If the minimal conceivable experience contains change, then change is an essenti...

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    If the minimal conceivable experience contains change, then change is ...77%Entirely static momentary experiences are impossible because the brief...75%If we believe our immediate experience exhibits continuity and embrace...75%When one has an experience of smooth continuous change, that experienc...74%

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    SEP: consciousness-temporal
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    Still more recently, Pelczar has argued (2010a, 2010b) that the Extensional model rests on an inadequate conception of the temporal microstructure of consciousness. An Extensional specious present is a chunk of experiencing which extends over a second or so of ordinary time, so it will inevitably possesses temporal parts – the still briefer chunks of experiencing of which it is composed – and the briefest of these parts will be strictly momentary episodes of experiencing. Since on the Extensiona

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