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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Buddhist claim conflates the absence of a Cartesian ego-substance with the absence of any identity-constituting relation, which are logically distinct positions.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If no identity-constituting relations obtain, then 'this person' cannot refer to a unified entity across time, collapsing the distinction between no-substance and no-identity.
      ?

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    • 2.Buddhist texts (Milinda Panha, Samyutta Nikaya) explicitly reject both substance AND continuity-based identity, suggesting Buddhists don't merely reject substrates but identity-relations themselves.
      ?

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    • 3.The logical distinction only matters if identity-relations can anchor continuity without substances, but Buddhism denies such relations operate—making the distinction practically empty.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Denying a Cartesian ego-substance (immaterial thinking subject) is logically compatible with affirming continuity relations like memory and causal connectedness.
      ?

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    • 2.Buddhist anatman doctrine targets metaphysical substrates, not psychological continuity, making the distinction between rejecting substance and rejecting identity-relations conceptually necessary.
      ?

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    • 3.One can coherently say 'no permanent self-essence exists' while accepting 'this person tomorrow will be constituted by today's mental states'—these make different metaphysical claims.
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