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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    Topics
    42
    The Cartesian conception of the self — according to which... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The Cartesian conception of the self — according to which 'I' picks out something distinct from the physical body — is untenable.

    Consciousness & MindPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Hume's bundle theory demonstrates that introspection never reveals a persisting Cartesian ego — only successive perceptions bound by memory and causation.
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    • 2.If the 'I' referred to a non-physical substance, personal identity through bodily change would require an unverifiable metaphysical anchor with no empirical content.
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    • 3.Parfit's reductionism shows that psychological continuity grounded in physical processes fully accounts for what matters in survival, making a Cartesian self explanatorily redundant.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wittgenstein's private language argument entails that a self constituted entirely apart from public, embodied practice could not sustain the rule-following necessary for self-ascription.
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    • 2.If 'I' picked out a non-physical substance, its reference could never be fixed through ostension or description, rendering the term semantically incoherent by causal theories of reference.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.One can ascribe experiences to oneself only if one is prepared to ascribe experiences to others.
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    • 2.A subject can meet this requirement only if the subject is able to pick out other subjects.
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    • 3.One cannot pick out non-spatial subjects.
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    Topics

    Personal IdentityConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Skepticism1 linked

    Related

    A subject can meet this requirement only if the subject is able to pick out othe...Hume's bundle theory demonstrates that introspection never reveals a persisting ...If 'I' picked out a non-physical substance, its reference could never be fixed t...If the 'I' referred to a non-physical substance, personal identity through bodil...
    +5 moreShow less
    One can ascribe experiences to oneself only if one is prepared to ascribe experi...One cannot pick out non-spatial subjects.Parfit's reductionism shows that psychological continuity grounded in physical p...The Cartesian self is a non-spatial subject distinct from the physical body.Wittgenstein's private language argument entails that a self constituted entirel...

    Similar

    The Cartesian self is a non-spatial subject distinct from the physical...82%The self is a different kind of entity from any physical body81%The conception of self is embedded in personhood80%The self is not the body, personality, awareness, thoughts, or feeling...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: strawson
    View source passageHide passage
    In the next chapter, entitled ‘Persons’, Strawson leaves behind speculation about concepts based on attenuated experiences, and focuses on our rich thought about ourselves. His argument involves a comparison between three conceptions of such thought. The first is what he calls the no-ownership view. This is the view that we do not really refer to ourselves when we use the first-person pronoun, even though we seem to. There is nothing that owns or has the experiences to which to refer. Strawson’s
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit