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    The Cartesian 'I think' conceives thinking as an activity... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Supports→Hegel's conception of real thinking departs from the Cartesian cogito.

    The Cartesian 'I think' conceives thinking as an activity of a subject (the 'I').

    Consciousness & MindTruth & Knowledge
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    For Hegel, real thinking is not an activity of a human or non-human subject but ...Hegel's conception of real thinking departs from the Cartesian cogito.Hegel's thinking gives rise to conceptions of both subject and object rather tha...

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    Both Hegel and Kant characterize thinking as an activity that operates...88%That thought is a thought of thinking.88%The Concept is itself a thought-object or object-thought85%All there is is thinking.85%

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    SEP: idealism
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    From this argument as to the sole reality of thinking, it is easy to derive a new conception of idealism that is not subject to the objections mentioned above that Hegel raised against the in his eyes one-sided attempts by his fellow post-Kantians, in particular of Fichte and Schelling. If all there is is thinking and if thinking is taken to be not only/primarily an activity of a (human) subject or something that can be present to the senses, but is conceived of as self-standing discursive/conce

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