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    The claim that potentiality always requires an external a... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The First Being has no potentiality for any predicate it does not already possess by its essence.

    The claim that potentiality always requires an external actualizer conflates ontological dependence with logical possibility, a distinction Scotus's formal distinction is precisely designed to preserve.

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    Key Terms

    Actualizer(in metaphysics)
    Something that causes a potential thing to become real or actual; the agent or force that makes something happen.
    Potentiality(Used in the Aristotelian sense; Fârâbî argues the First Being has no potentiality.)
    The capacity of a being to possess a predicate or property it does not currently possess by its essence, requiring actualization by something external that already has that property.
    Scotus(The philosopher whose reasoning is being analyzed)
    A medieval philosopher (John Duns Scotus, 1266-1308) known for his detailed logical arguments about God, free will, and how things exist.
    formal distinction(Scotus's account of the relationship between nature and haecceity in a particular)
    A distinction between inseparable features that are nonetheless not identical — neither really distinct nor merely conceptually distinct

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    logical possibility(Used in the context of evaluating whether Blockhead (a philosophical thought experiment) could exist)
    A state of affairs that is not ruled out by the laws of logic; distinct from physical or metaphysical possibility
    ontological dependence(Metaphysics)
    A relation in which the existence or nature of one thing is accounted for by appeal to other things (e.g., a complex object exists because its parts exist; a set exists because its members exist)

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    1 linked claim · 2 topics

    Proof of definition segments1 linkedDivine Attributes1 linked
    The First Being has no potentiality for any predicate it does not already posses...

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    The First Being has no potentiality for any predicate it does not already posses...

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