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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The color physicalist must explain what the features presented in or represented in color experience are, given that those features are distinct from reflectances.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If the relevant features of color similarity and difference are features presented in or represented in experience, those features stand in relations of similarity and difference.
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    • 2.These experiential features are different from reflectances (the physical properties color physicalism typically identifies with color).
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    • 3.A color physicalist who appeals to experiential features must give a positive account of what those features are.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Reflectances are defined relationally: they are dispositions to reflect light percentages across wavelengths under standard conditions, not intrinsic surface properties.
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    • 2.Johnston's 'revelation thesis' shows color experience presents properties as intrinsic, creating a structural mismatch that forces physicalists to identify a distinct categorical base.
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    • 3.The categorical base grounding reflectance dispositions—surface microstructure—constitutes a physically real feature that color experience tracks, satisfying the demand for a positive account.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Byrne and Hilbert's selectionist physicalism holds that colors are specific reflectance types (SSRs) selected by evolution precisely because they covary with the similarity structure in color experience.
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    • 2.This covariance between SSR structure and experiential similarity space provides the positive account demanded: experiential features represent objective groupings within reflectance property space.
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    • 3.Cohen's relationalist objection notwithstanding, the mathematical isomorphism between Munsell color space and SSR similarity space is an empirically confirmed, non-trivial explanatory resource.
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