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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The conceivability of disembodied minds may reflect epistemic gaps rather than genuine metaphysical possibility, undermining the conceivability argument's force.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Epistemic gaps exist in many domains yet some conceivable scenarios remain genuinely possible; the gap alone doesn't establish impossibility.
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    • 2.Conceivability of disembodied minds is more robust than historical false positives—it survives rigorous philosophical scrutiny across centuries and cultures.
      ?

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    • 3.The argument doesn't require disembodied minds to causally interact; conceivability only entails logical possibility, not causal efficacy.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.We cannot conceive of consciousness's neural basis despite centuries of neuroscience, suggesting conceivability reflects ignorance, not possibility.
      ?

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    • 2.Historical examples show conceivable scenarios later proved impossible (e.g., perpetual motion); conceivability is an unreliable guide to metaphysics.
      ?

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    • 3.If disembodied minds were genuinely possible, we'd expect more empirical evidence or theoretical explanation of how they causally interact with physics.
      ?

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