Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    The concept of intelligence does not rule out intelligent... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The concept of intelligence does not rule out intelligent beings implemented as discrete-state machines.

    Consciousness & MindPhilosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.There is nothing in the concept of intelligence that rules out intelligent beings with quantised sensory devices.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.There is nothing in the concept of intelligence that rules out intelligent beings with digital working parts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Intelligence requires intentionality: mental states must be 'about' something, possessing intrinsic semantic content.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Discrete-state machines manipulate symbols purely by syntactic rules, never grounding symbols in genuine meaning (Searle, 'Minds, Brains, and Programs', 1980).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A system lacking intrinsic intentionality cannot instantiate intelligence, regardless of its substrate or functional organization.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Phenomenal consciousness—the 'what it is like' character of experience—is a constitutive feature of genuine intelligence, not a mere epiphenomenon (Nagel, 1974).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Discrete-state machines, as purely combinatorial systems, cannot account for qualitative experience by any computable functional description (Chalmers' hard problem, 1995).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Ruling out phenomenal consciousness from intelligence's definition presupposes a controversial eliminativist or functionalist conclusion rather than establishing one.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    A system lacking intrinsic intentionality cannot instantiate intelligence, regar...Discrete-state machines manipulate symbols purely by syntactic rules, never grou...Discrete-state machines, as purely combinatorial systems, cannot account for qua...Intelligence requires intentionality: mental states must be 'about' something, p...
    +4 moreShow less
    Phenomenal consciousness—the 'what it is like' character of experience—is a cons...Ruling out phenomenal consciousness from intelligence's definition presupposes a...There is nothing in the concept of intelligence that rules out intelligent being...There is nothing in the concept of intelligence that rules out intelligent being...

    Similar

    There is nothing in the concept of intelligence that rules out intelli...87%There is nothing in the concept of intelligence that rules out intelli...85%It is not established that human beings are not themselves essentially...84%The intellect is none of the particular beings it knows.76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: turing-test
    View source passageHide passage
    Turing’s response to this kind of argument seems to be that a continuous-state machine can be imitated by discrete-state machines with very small levels of error. Just as differential analyzers can be imitated by digital computers to within quite small margins of error, so too, the conversation of human beings can be imitated by digital computers to margins of error that would not be detected by ordinary interrogators playing the imitation game. It is not clear that this is the right kind of res
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit