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    The conceptual containment grounding contingent truths is... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Finite human minds cannot discover the sufficient reason for contingent truths such as Caesar crossing the Rubicon

    The conceptual containment grounding contingent truths is buried too deeply in the subject concept

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    Finite human minds cannot discover the sufficient reason for contingent truths s...Human minds are finite and can only complete analyses in a finite number of step...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    The conceptual containment of the predicate in the subject is the suff...85%Conceptual containment grounds the truth of contingent propositions83%A contingent truth cannot explain or ground a necessary truth without ...82%For every true contingent proposition, such a conceptual containment r...79%

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    This has led some commenters to think that Leibniz gave up the account of sufficient reason as an a priori proof. If there were a proof or demonstration, it would reveal that the concept of the predicate was contained in the concept of the subject in a finite number of steps and hence every proposition would be necessary. Leibniz is not a necessitarian in his mature philosophy and thus he could not have accepted this consequence. Instead, he must have shifted from the conception of a sufficient

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