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    The content of everyone's self-legislation must be the sa... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    The content of everyone's self-legislation must be the same, assuming relevantly similar circumstances.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.There are standards of rational willing that constrain what anyone could will to serve as requirements incumbent on all agents.
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    • 2.These standards apply uniformly across agents in relevantly similar circumstances.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Agents occupy irreducibly different social positions, roles, and relational obligations that constitute morally relevant circumstances.
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    • 2.What counts as 'relevantly similar circumstances' cannot be determined independently of particular social and historical contexts.
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    • 3.Therefore, the universalizability constraint underdetermines content, permitting divergent yet equally rational self-legislation.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Aristotle's particularism holds that practical wisdom (phronesis) requires sensitivity to particulars that no universal maxim can fully capture.
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    • 2.If the virtuous agent's judgment is the standard of right action, self-legislation is indexed to individual character and context, not universal form.
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    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Related

    Agents occupy irreducibly different social positions, roles, and relational obli...Aristotle's particularism holds that practical wisdom (phronesis) requires sensi...If the virtuous agent's judgment is the standard of right action, self-legislati...There are standards of rational willing that constrain what anyone could will to...
    +3 moreShow less
    Therefore, the universalizability constraint underdetermines content, permitting...These standards apply uniformly across agents in relevantly similar circumstance...What counts as 'relevantly similar circumstances' cannot be determined independe...

    Similar

    Free individuals all share the same nature and act on the same princip...73%Free individuals share the same nature and act on the same rational pr...69%Full self-ownership holds that individuals are normatively separate69%Another norm requires that persons with identical non-responsible feat...68%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: normativity-metaethics
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    One approach, which is suggested by Kant, seeks to explain normativity in terms of norms that one could rationally will to serve as requirements incumbent on all agents (1785 [1981]). This can be described as a matter of self-legislation, since each person is viewed in effect as herself legislating these norms to serve as requirements on all agents. On this view, as Kantians develop it, the content of everyone’s “self-legislation” must be the same, assuming relevantly similar circumstances. For
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit