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    The content of what a speaker says is not always determin... — Carmelics
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    The content of what a speaker says is not always determined by the speaker's beliefs, even when those beliefs are shared by everyone in the conversation.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Elwood believes he is John Searle, and everyone in the conversation shares this belief.
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    • 2.Yet what Elwood says when he introduces himself as John Searle is the falsehood that Elwood is John Searle, not a truth.
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    • 3.If shared beliefs determined content, what Elwood said would be true (since everyone believes he is Searle), but it is false.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.On a Gricean cooperative framework, what a speaker 'says' is fixed by conventional linguistic meaning plus reference assignment, not belief.
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    • 2.In the Elwood case, the shared false belief fails to reassign the referent of 'John Searle' away from Searle himself, since proper names are rigid designators.
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    • 3.Therefore the case shows only that beliefs cannot override rigid designation, not that beliefs never partially constitute propositional content.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.On contextualist accounts (Stanley, Recanati), the context that determines content is the objective context of utterance, not the psychological states of participants.
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    • 2.The Elwood scenario conflates the epistemic situation of hearers with the semantic context, but even shared false beliefs remain outside the context that fixes reference.
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    • 3.Thus the argument's premise that 'if shared beliefs determined content, the utterance would be true' misidentifies which beliefs are theoretically relevant to content determination.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    Related

    Elwood believes he is John Searle, and everyone in the conversation shares this ...If shared beliefs determined content, what Elwood said would be true (since ever...In the Elwood case, the shared false belief fails to reassign the referent of 'J...On a Gricean cooperative framework, what a speaker 'says' is fixed by convention...
    +5 moreShow less
    On contextualist accounts (Stanley, Recanati), the context that determines conte...The Elwood scenario conflates the epistemic situation of hearers with the semant...Therefore the case shows only that beliefs cannot override rigid designation, no...Thus the argument's premise that 'if shared beliefs determined content, the utte...Yet what Elwood says when he introduces himself as John Searle is the falsehood ...

    Similar

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: pragmatics
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    Objective versus subjective There are a number of cases, however, in which the speaker’s beliefs, even if shared by everyone in the conversation, do not seem to determine content. Suppose, for example, that Elwood’s hero worship of John Searle has reached such a point that he now takes himself to be John Searle. He introduces himself to the new class of Stanford graduate students by saying, “I’m John Searle, from across the Bay.” It seems that even if he and everyone in the conversation believe
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit