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    The contents of most philosophical intuitions will not be... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    The contents of most philosophical intuitions will not be part of the best explanation of our having those intuitions (outside of attitude contexts).

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • There is equally good reason to apply the reasoning behind [P1] to philosophical intuitions as to other propositions.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Rationalist accounts (Bealer, BonJour) hold that a priori intuitions are produced by rational insight into conceptual or necessary structures.
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    • 2.If rational insight is a genuine epistemic faculty, the content of the intuition—the necessary truth grasped—is constitutively part of its own best explanation.
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    • 3.Harman-style inference-to-best-explanation skepticism applies most forcefully to contingent empirical beliefs, not to intuitions whose truth-conditions are necessary.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Some philosophical intuitions track modal truths (e.g., that contradictions are impossible) whose content directly explains why we have them.
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    • 2.If intuitions are reliable indicators of necessity, their contents figure in the best causal-explanatory story of our cognitive access to those truths.
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    Related

    Harman-style inference-to-best-explanation skepticism applies most forcefully to...If intuitions are reliable indicators of necessity, their contents figure in the...If rational insight is a genuine epistemic faculty, the content of the intuition...Rationalist accounts (Bealer, BonJour) hold that a priori intuitions are produce...
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    Some philosophical intuitions track modal truths (e.g., that contradictions are ...There is equally good reason to apply the reasoning behind [P1] to philosophical...

    Similar

    We are not justified in accepting the contents of philosophical intuit...82%Our best explanations of the occurrence of intuitions (intuitings) do ...82%Skeptical arguments against intuitions aim to show that intuitions do ...82%There is equally good reason to apply the reasoning behind [P1] to phi...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: intuition
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    The normative premise, [P1], is perfectly general and hence may be equally deployed to undermine justified belief of any proposition failing its standard. Indeed, there seems equally good reason to think that the propositions which are the contents of most philosophical intuitions will not be part (outside of attitude contexts) of the best explanation of our having those intuitions. (See Goldman 1989, 1992 for similar skeptical arguments regarding the use of intuitions in contemporary metaphysic
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit