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    The correctness conditions of concepts alone are not suff... — Carmelics
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    The correctness conditions of concepts alone are not sufficient to establish CE normativity.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Correctness conditions specify only extension-membership, which is a semantic relation obtaining independently of any agent's cognitive states or dispositions.
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    • 2.Kripke's rule-following considerations show that no fact about extension alone determines how a rule ought to be applied in novel cases.
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    • 3.Without a subject-involving 'ought', correctness conditions yield only descriptive fit, not the prescriptive force that distinguishes genuine normativity.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Brandom's inferentialist account demonstrates that conceptual content requires commitment and entitlement relations among agents, not merely satisfaction conditions.
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    • 2.A purely extensional correctness condition is compatible with an infinite range of deviant applications, as Goodman's grue paradox illustrates, leaving application norms underdetermined.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.In the case of concepts, the application relation holds merely between a concept and the objects that fall under it.
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    • 2.For normativity to enter, a connection must be made with the subject who employs the concepts and with her mental states.
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    Related

    A purely extensional correctness condition is compatible with an infinite range ...Brandom's inferentialist account demonstrates that conceptual content requires c...Correctness conditions specify only extension-membership, which is a semantic re...For normativity to enter, a connection must be made with the subject who employs...
    +3 moreShow less
    In the case of concepts, the application relation holds merely between a concept...Kripke's rule-following considerations show that no fact about extension alone d...Without a subject-involving 'ought', correctness conditions yield only descripti...

    Similar

    Semantic correctness is a normative notion.90%A direct argument for conceptual-content (CE) normativity can be const...89%The normativist would have to provide reasons why the non-normativist ...87%If the normativist and anti-normativist concepts of semantic correctne...86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: meaning-normativity
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    As in the case of meaning, we may distinguish between more or less direct arguments. One way to provide a direct argument for CE normativity would be to proceed from the notion of correctness conditions, in analogy with the simple argument (Boghossian 2003: 85). Just as meaningful expressions have correctness conditions essentially, along the lines of (CM), so do concepts: The concept green, for instance, applies to an object \(x\) if and only if \(x\) is green. However, unlike in the case of
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit